We interpret the modal µ-calculus over a new model [10] , to give a temporal logic suitable for systems exhibiting both probabilistic and demonic nondeterminism. The logical formulae are real-valued, and the statements are not limited to properties that hold with probability 1.
Introduction

Background
Since Pnueli introduced temporal logic to computer science, the logic has been extended in various ways to include probability. One approach is to retain the standard syntax while altering the interpretation: probabilistic transitions are allowed in the computation, and the validity of the formulae is weakened to 'with probability 1'. The 0-1 law of Sharir, Pnueli and Hart [9] shows that there are many systems in which such validity depends only on the transition probabilities' being nonzero, not on their precise values, and that has been exploited by many authors (for example Vardi [27] and Rao [23] ).
Vardi's treatment of the "probabilistic universality problem" [27] extends that to demonic nondeterminism, thus an early example of combining both quantitative and qualititative uncertainty: the latter is characteristic of adversarial schedulers, for example. By removing the demonic choices first -a determinising 'subset' construction -he reduces the problem to a (nearly) deterministic version, and then proceeds from there. The results however remain qualititive: verification with respect to 'proper' probabilities (neither 0 nor 1) or other quantitative aspects (expected efficiency) requires different techniques.
Other approaches address explicit probabilities, but then forgo demonic nondeterminism [6] ; yet nondeterminism is not only an unavoidable aspect of some problems but -as abstraction -is essential for forming layered descriptions of complex systems.
Finally, recent work by Bianco and de Alfaro [3] , based on the pCTL of Aziz [1] and ultimately ideas of Hansson and Jonsson [8] , allows both explicit probability and nondeterminism, recognising that the effect of standard nondeterminism is to force probabilistic judgements to give upper-or lower bounds rather than exact values: one speaks of judgements that hold 'with probability at least (or at most) p'. The formulae contain both Boolean and numeric components.
Our approach differs from all the above. It is quantitative (not only universal), it includes demonic (and potentially angelic) nondeterminism, it does not determinise to reduce to pure probabilities, and finally it does not mix Boolean and numeric formulae: the formulae are uniformly numeric. This report describes the two principal contributions: one contribution is conceptual, and the other is technical.
Conceptual contribution
The conceptual contribution (Sec. 3.1) is that probabilistic and demonic temporal behaviour can be described by a µ-calculus [15] based on reals rather than Booleans. The underlying model is of a branching-time computation using the now-common 'sets of probability distributions', and it is connected to a program logic via the 'expectation transformers' originally introduced by Kozen [13] for deterministic probabilistic programs and extended by us [20] to include demonic programs as well.
Formulae become real-rather than Boolean-valued functions of the state space; they can then be interpreted directly as probabilities, but more generally they are to be regarded as expectations (of random variables from probability theory). The resulting 'quantitative logic' easily accommodates analogues of temporal operators like 'next' (• or ∀X), 'eventually' (Q or ∀F ) and 'always' (P or ∀G) -the first is interpreted as the effect of executing a single step within a probabilistic transition system, and the last two operators can express the probability of 'eventually' or 'always' properties with respect to probability distributions over paths in a computation tree generated by repeated probabilistic steps.
1 The path-distributions are determined by transition probabilities in the usual way (measures over Borel sets based on cylinders).
One advantage of using µ-calculus is to side-step explicit mention of the path distributions, relying instead on the correspondence proved elsewhere [14, 13, 20] between program logic and transition semantics. But there are practical benefits as well: we find that general expectations allow us to treat more than probabilities -indeed often an expected quantitity such as 'number of steps to termination' is required, rather than a specific probability. This logic based on expectations allows us to calculate the desired value directly [25, 16] .
Technical contribution
The technical contribution is to determine what the correct generalisations of the standard Boolean propositional and modal operators should be: what are conjunction, disjunction and implication between real numbers; and what µ-formulae should represent the temporal operators over the reals? For the propositional operators (Sec. 3.2) we rely on the main result of our earlier work [20] which gave an exact arithmetic characterisation of 'demonic and probabilistic expectation transformers'; from it we extract definitions of probabilistic conjunction, disjunction and implication. For the temporal operators (Sec. 3.3) we appeal to operational arguments given in a companion paper [19] which tells us what their corresponding fixed-point formulations should be. With those together, we obtain an extension of Ben-Ari's axiomatisation [2] of branching-time temporal logic in which the structure of the formulae is largely preserved, even when reasoning over properly quantitative values (i.e. those not only 0 or 1).
The main insight is that probabilistic conjunction enables modular reasoning that is applicable even for probabilistic information. Although the probabilistic conjunction arises from the novel axioms characterising probabilistic sequential programs [20] , where the distributions are over states, here we see it is equally apt when the probabilities derive instead from distributions over paths.
In obtaining our extension of the laws we observe that much of the operational intuition underlying standard temporal logic is valid for probability as well; because the laws are so similar to the standard ones, many proofs of probabilistic temporal properties will merely be replayings of their standard counterparts; both observations encourage us in the expectation-transformer approach.
Overview
Sec. 2 reviews nonprobabilistic branching-time temporal logic, in its predicate transformer formulation; Sec. 3 describes the probabilistic/demonic model, illustrated by a running example of demonically-nondeterministic coin-flipping; and Sec. 4 examines properties of the model and investigates the identities it supports.
In Sec. 5 we treat the random walk, an elementary example but one which nevertheless is completely beyond the reach of logics that do not quantify probabilities explicitly. Even the 'universal' [27] conclusion "the walker moves left eventually with probability 1" requires properly numeric premises, that the onestep probability is 1/2 in either direction. But in the more general case where those specific probabilities are not 1/2, even the conclusion is no longer universal: the probability of an eventual move is somewhere strictly between 0 and 1. In the example, without referring to the underlying computation tree at all, we reproduce the elementary result that a probabilistic demonic walker whose probability of moving left or right is bounded below by 1/3 (i.e. it is not known exactly) will return eventually with probability at least 1 − √ 5/3. In Sec. 6 we examine the benefits and limitations of using expectations, and discuss how our contributions relate to other approaches, in particular to pCTL and pCTL*. We also discuss model checking briefly.
We write f.x for function f applied to argument x, left-associative and binding more tightly than all except modal operators; and this: = that introduces or instantiates this, defining it to be equal to that .
Standard temporal logic
Standard (nonprobabilistic) branching-time temporal logic is usually interpreted over computation trees; but an equivalent alternative is to use predicate transformers [4, 21] , which we now review. Via probabilistic predicate transformers [20] we will then, in the next section, generalise the model to include probability.
The model is based on a state space S; we identify predicates with the subsets PS of S, and define the predicate transformers T S to be the functions step in PS → PS satisfying the healthiness conditions [4] A predicate-transformer model (S, step) for standard temporal logic comprises a state space S and a (predicate) transformer step in T S -the transformer represents one step in the computation about which temporal statements can be made, so that S corresponds to the nodes and step to the arcs of a computation tree in which branching represents nondeterminism. we fix the model (S, step), and use µ, ν denote least-and greatest fixed point respectively of monotonic transformers over PS. 
Predicate QA holds in just those states from which repeated steps (possibly none) will reach a state in which A holds.
The least fixed point is used because if infinite execution is possible from s without reaching A then s ∈ QA.
Note that Q is not healthy: it fails positive conjunctivity.
Definition 2.3 always
Predicate PA holds in just those states from which repeated steps (possibly none) never leave states in which A holds.
The greatest fixed point is used because if infinite execution is possible from s without leaving A then s ∈ PA. Operationally, we now note the correspondence with branching-time temporal logic, via the isomorphism [11] that links healthy transformers with relations between initial and final states. That ensures that step represents a state-tostate relation.
Taking eventually for example, define some syntactic program
Step so that step = wp.
Step, where the semantic function wp takes programs to their meanings as transformers, and consider the predicate wp.(do ¬A → Step od).true (1) that holds in just those states from which repeated execution of Step eventually establishes A. Simple calculation using the µ-semantics of do · · · od [4] shows that indeed (1) equals QA as defined above.
• A more thorough justification of Definition 2.2 appears elsewhere [19, Sec.4.2] ; and a similar justification can be given for PA.
We note that Definitions 3.3-3.5 have all the properties 5 listed in Fig. 1 ; as a further illustration we give a direct proof of the following familiar fact. 3 Probabilistic temporal logic
Expectations and their transformers
Standard predicate transformer semantics can be generalised to replace demonic choice by probabilistic choice [6] -but more interesting is to add probabilistic choice while retaining demonic nondeterminism [10, 20] . By doing the latter, and generalising the definitions of the previous section, we obtain a model for probabilistic branching-time temporal logic.
Again take state space S; but define now the expectations ES over S as the functions S → [0, 1] from S into the closed interval [0, 1], and define expectation transformers PS to be the functions step in ES → ES satisfying the probabilistic healthiness conditions given further below.
Expectation transformers are due to Kozen [14] for programs containing probabilistic choice but no demonic nondeterminism, and correspond to an operational model in which programs are functions from initial states to final probabilistic distributions over states [13] :
Let program prog take initial states in S to final distributions over S; write D X for the expected value of random variable X over distribution D. Then the pre-expectation at state s of program prog, with respect to post-expectation A, is defined to be the expected value of A over the distribution prog.s obtained by executing prog from s:
wp.prog.A.s : = prog.s
A .
In particular, if the post-expectation is the characteristic function of some predicate, then the pre-expectation is the probability that the program will establish that predicate.
Kozen's deterministic model [13] was extended to include nondeterminism by He [10] , where programs are functions from initial state to sets of final distributions with certain closure conditions; Kozen's deterministic logic [14] was similarly extended by Morgan [20] , who showed further that He's model corresponds exactly to the healthy expectation transformers of the logic. 6 The interpretation becomes Let program prog take initial states in S to sets of final distributions over S. Then the greatest pre-expectation of program prog with respect to post-expectation A is defined:
Nondeterminism is therefore demonic in the sense that it acts to minimise the pre-expectation at each initial state; the definition above is thus the greatest expectation everywhere no more than those pointwise minima. Predicates embed into expectations as functions in S → {0, 1}, so that the constant expectations 0 and 1, yielding 0 and 1 respectively in all states, replace predicates ∅ and S. (To avoid the clutter of an explicit embedding function, for predicate A and state s we will write either s ∈ A or A.s = 1 etc. as convenient.)
The relations ⊆, = and ⊇, acting between predicates, embed to ⇛ -everywhere no more than, ≡ -(everywhere) equal and ⇚ -everywhere no less than, which are relations between expectations.
Embedded predicate transformers take characteristic functions to characteristic functions, and the weakest precondition becomes a greatest pre-expectation. We refer to the embeddings as standard expectations and transformers.
For example, let S be {x, y, z} and consider the (deterministic) program that takes any initial state s to the final distribution states x, y, z with probabilities p, q, r respectively,
where p + q + r = 1. Its corresponding predicate transformer step is defined
which is the expected value of A over the given final distribution. (Note that it is a constant expectation, independent of s, since the action of the program does not depend on the initial state.) Now consider the embedding of the predicate {x, y}; writing the set for its embedding, we have
since {x, y}.x = {x, y}.y = 1 and {x, y}.z = 0, giving the probability p + q that executing step results in a state in {x, y}. Note that step itself is standard when exactly one of p, q, r is 1 (and the others 0), and the pre-expectation is then standard also: it is 1 (S or 'true') when the program guarantees a result x or y, and 0 (∅ or 'false') otherwise.
Probabilistic healthiness conditions
In this section we discuss the generalisations of the propositional operators.
The healthiness conditions for standard programs (Sec. 2) serve two purposes; (theoretical) they characterise exactly the predicate transformers that correspond to 'real' programs as relations between initial and final states; and (practical) they allow the proof of many algebraic laws over programs -for example, positive conjunctivity shows that nondeterminism right-distributes over sequential composition.
We discovered elsewhere [20] that the exact characterisation of probabilistic/demonic transformers is given by the conditions of Fig. 2 ; and they lead directly to the characterisation of probabilistic next (Fig. 6 below) . That in turn will allow us to prove probabilistic analogues (Fig. 7 below) of the standard properties in Fig. 1 .
The probabilistic healthiness conditions are listed in Fig. 2 , where we use the notations
The above together are equivalent to the single condition sublinearity, together with the convention that binary scalar operators apply pointwise between expectations. We note first that excluded miracle and monotonicity are simple generalisations of their standard versions. Scaling does not have a standard counterpart; but it reflects merely that expectations of random variables distribute scalar multiplication. We show that the remaining two probabilistic conditions act together to generalise positive conjunctivity, and that an 'obvious choice' ⊓ (minimum) is incorrect.
It is not true in general that step.(A ⊓ B) ≡ step.A ⊓ step.B. Taking step from (3), we have for example step.({x, y} ⊓ {y, z}) ≡ step.{y} ≡ q , but on the other hand step.{x, y} ⊓ step.{y, z} ≡ p + q ⊓ q + r ≡ q when neither p nor r is 0.
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The correct generalisation of positive conjunctivity is subdistributivity of '&', defined as follows:
The definition is motivated by taking a, b, c all 1 in sublinearity (Fig. 2) , and is justified by Lemma 3.2 to follow and the fact that it implies conjunctivity when restricted to standard arguments (shown below). for all expectations A, B. Proof
arithmetic; definition &
Returning to the example above, we note that indeed (p + q) & (q + r) = q; the special case of equality is due to step's being deterministic and terminating.
To show that &-subdistributivity implies positive conjunctivity, let all of step, A, B be standard. We have step.(A⊓B) ⇛ step.A⊓step.B by monotonicity, and we have the converse step.(A⊓B) ⇚ step.A⊓step.B from &-subdistributivity because on standard expectations & and ⊓ agree.
A probabilistic model
In this section we discuss the generalisation of the modal operators; following Definition 3.4 below we give the operational justification for them.
The probabilistic model merely replaces the standard transformer by a probabilistic one, and generalises the standard operators' definitions (Defs. 2.1-2.3) to act with maximum and minimum over expectations rather than with union and intersection over sets. We now give those definitions, and use a running example to illustrate them.
An expectation-transformer model (S, step) for probabilistic temporal logic comprises a state space S and a healthy expectation transformer step, with the following definitions.
Definition 3.3 probabilistic next
•A : = step.A . Expectation •A is the expected value of A after exactly one step. If A is standard then •A is the greatest guaranteed probability that one step will establish A.
If from some initial state step can yield several possible final distributions, the greatest probability with which step is guaranteed to reach A is the infimum of the expectation of A over those distributions.
We now illustrate Definition 3.3 with a simple example, involving both probabilistic and nondeterministic choice.
Consider two fair coins: the thin coin gives heads or tails with probability 1/2 each; the fat coin gives heads, tails or edge with probability 1/3 each. At most one coin is flipped at a time, and the state space S is {h, t, e}, representing the result of the most recent flip. The computation step is defined
where 'or' in an action represents demonic nondeterminism. Fig. 3 tabulates
•A for that step over all standard A: note how the demon acts to minimise the probability of achieving the postcondition, when there is a choice.
For an illustration of proper expectations consider ••{t, e}.h, that is, applying • to the nonstandard expectation •{t, e} and evaluating it at state h. We which is the largest guaranteed probability of reaching state t or e in exactly two steps from state h.
Definition 3.4 probabilistic eventually
Expectation QA is the greatest expected value of A that can be realised by deciding 'angelically' (⊔) whether to take one step (•X) or to stop (A), with 'never stop' interpreted as 0 (µ). If A is standard then QA is the greatest probability that repeated steps are guaranteed to reach a state in which A holds.
In Definition 3.4 we have generalised Boolean ∨ to arithmetic ⊔ (and below in Definition 3.5 we take ∧ to ⊓). The justification for that (for ⊔ rather than say the dual of &) is operational: it can be shown [19] that QA as defined here is the supremum over all Boolean guards G of the pre-expectation wp.(do G → Step od).A .
•∅ ≡ 0 Excluded miracle, since ⊔{} = 0.
•{h}.h = 1/3 Flip fat; flipping thin would give 1/2.
•{h}.t = 0 Do nothing; flipping would give 1/3.
•{h}.e = 0
Cannot leave e.
•{t}.h = 1/3 Flip fat; flipping thin would give 1/2.
•{t}.t = 1/3 Flip; doing nothing would give 1.
•{t}.e = 0
•{e} ≡ {e} At {h} flip thin, at {t} do nothing: both avoid e.
•{h, t}.h = 2/3 Flip fat; flipping thin would give 1.
•{h, t}.t = 1
The choice makes no difference.
•{h, t}.e = 0
Cannot leave e. * •{t, e}.h = 1/2 Flip thin; flipping fat would give 2/3.
•{t, e}.t = 2/3 Flip; doing nothing would give 1.
•{t, e}.e = 1
•{e, h}.h = 1/2 Flip thin; flipping fat would give 2/3.
•{e, h}.t = 0 Doing nothing remains at t.
•{e, h}.e = 1
•{h, t, e} ≡ 1 Termination guaranteed.
At * we have for example
•{t, e}.h Flipping either coin repeatedly is guaranteed to leave h; repeating thin would guarantee reaching t. Repeating fat splits the eventual departure fairly between arriving at t and at e. Q{t}.t = 1 Already at t. Q{t}.e = 0
Q{e} ≡ {e}
At h flip thin, at t do nothing; both avoid e. Q{h, t} ≡ {h, t} If at e, cannot leave it. Q{t, e} ≡ 1
Flipping either coin repeatedly is guaranteed to leave h eventually. Q{e, h} ≡ {e, h} Forever do nothing at t. Q{h, t, e} ≡ 1 At h, t, e already: termination not required.
At * we have for example It is the highest attainable probability over all 'strategies' G that determine whether or not to take another step in attempting to reach A. That interpretation is the same as in the standard case, where however the strategy is particularly simple: it is 'keep going as long as A does not hold', equivalently 'take G to be ¬A'. The interplay of angelic and demonic nondeterminism in Q is significant: the choice of whether to stop or to step is made to maximise the expectation; but the resolution of nondeterminism during a step is made to minimise it. Fig. 4 Expectation PA is the least expected value of A that can be realised by deciding 'demonically' (⊓) whether to take one step (•X) or to stop (A), with 'never stop' interpreted as 1 (ν). If A is standard then PA is the greatest probability that repeated steps are guaranteed never to leave states in which A holds.
Both the choice of whether to stop or to step, and the resolution of nondeterminism during a step, are demonic in this case. Fig. 5 tabulates PA.s for standard A and s varying over S in the coin example.
For proper expectations define A: = {e} ⊔ Q{t}, and consider PA. Expectation A is the probability that the last flip was edge or -if it was not -that tails will be flipped eventually. To calculate PA we first consider state e, where we have PA.e = 1 ⊓ •PA.e = PA.e , whose greatest solution is PA.e: = 1.
At state h we have
Repeated flips of either coin eventually leave h. P{t} ≡ 0 Repeated flips eventually leave t. P{e} ≡ {e} Cannot leave e. P{h, t} ≡ 0
Repeated flips leave h, t.
P{t, e}.h = 0 Already not in t, e. * P{t, e}.t = 1/2 Repeated flips are guaranteed to leave t eventually, then reaching e with probability 1/2. P{t, e}.e = 1
P{e, h} ≡ {e} Repeated flips of thin at h are guaranteed to reach t. The operational meaning of P({e} ⊔ Q{t}).t = 3/4 is perhaps not obvious, however; we interpret it as follows. The demon 'in P' will take repeated steps in order to minimise the expectation {e} ⊔ Q{t} -it will seek a state that is not e, and from which the probability of eventually reaching t is lowest. Thus the demon seeks h.
To seek h the demon flips fat repeatedly, but with a risk of 1/2 that on leaving t it ends up in e instead. If it does reach h (probability 1/2), it must hand over to an angel 'in Q' who then tries to reach t again (probability Q{t}.h = 1/2).
Thus P{e}⊔Q{t}.t is 1/2×1 for the demon's leaving t to end up in e directly -plus 1/2 for leaving t to reach h times 1/2 for the probability of the angel's subsequent return to t.
Properties of the model
Given the structural correspondence between the standard and probabilistic models, one would expect them to share many temporal laws. Although we do not attempt a complete axiomatisation, in this section we give a systematic presentation of the basic temporal laws, and show how with suitable choices of probabilistic 'propositional' operators (⊔, ⊓, &, and ⇒, ⇉ below) the standard axioms ( Fig. 1) can be generalised and proved (Fig. 7) .
The basic properties of the temporal operators are summarised in Fig. 6 , whose structure is as follows. The healthiness conditions generate the properties for next, ensuring [20] the existence of a corresponding relational probabilistic healthiness conditions excluded miracle
weighted sum Figure 6 : Basic properties of probabilistic temporal operators.
computation [10] to whose single step next refers. 9 The pairs of properties for eventually and always are the usual for extremal fixed points, determining them uniquely.
Since the probabilistic definitions of the temporal operators replace the standard ∪, ∩ with ⊔, ⊓ respectively, whose properties are so similar, many standard results -and their proofs -are trivially retained: Lemma 2.4 generalises to Lemma A.1 for example.
For probabilistic implication there are several choices, one of which is the trivial embedding of standard implication. With those definitions we can write probabilistic analogues of the standard axioms, listed in Fig. 7 . All can be proved from the basic properties Fig. 6 and the definitions of the two implications; possibly the longest proof is of * * .
Lemma 4.3 always-eventually For all expectations A, B we have
Our generalisation of Ben-Ari's laws establishes that the operational intuitions underlying standard branching-time temporal logic apply also to the quantitative logic. The real surprise however lies in our choice of operators; specifically our insistence on two kinds of 'probabilistic implication' reveals the operational principles communicated by the laws in Fig. 1 , and we conclude this section with a brief examination of what they are.
The axioms in Fig. 7 (and in Fig. 1 ) essentially fall into two classes: those which combine quantities 'conjunctively' (indicated by the ¡ symbol in the Fig. 7 ) and those which are designed to be more specific about the operational meaning of the temporal operators in relation to 'next'.
Considering the former kind we find exclusive use of & and its adjoint ⇉. Recall from Fig. 6 that & generalises ordinary (Boolean) conjunction to the probabilistic context; thus its appearance here is explained once we notice that the purpose of the ¡-indicated laws is to set out appropriate ways of combining probabilities.
The remaining two laws (without ¡ in the figure) require the introduction of ⇒, our alternative generalisation of implication; and by taking a closer look at the laws' operational motivation we see why. Considering the fourth law from Fig. 7 we notice that the expression 'A ⇒ •A' defines a {0, 1}-valued expectation (and thus corresponds to a predicate). Used as a guard in the loop do (A ⇒ wp.
Step.A) → Step od , we obtain the operational interpretation of P(A ⇒ •A) using a greatest fixed point semantics for the loop (compare Sec. 2), when we instantiate • by wp.step. [19] . Attempting to find any operational relationship between the alternative A & P(A ⇉ •A) and PA has proved to be fruitless.
In spite of the above explanations, one might nevertheless be tempted to experiment by replacing & by ⊓ and ⇉ by ⇒ in Fig. 7 ; the hope would be to obtain a set of stonger laws using fewer operators, since the inequalities
(holding for all expectations A, B over S) would supply tighter relationships between probabilistic expressions than those set out in Fig. 7 . We present a trivial example to illustrate the failure of such experiments. Consider the transition diagram set out in Fig. 8 which describes a single computation step; we interpret • as that step, in the temporal formulae.
We take as our example an attempted strengthening of ** in Fig. 7 by showing that P({b, c} ⇉ {c}) ⊓ Q{b, c} ⇛ Q{c} does not hold for the system of Fig. 8 . We compare the left-hand side, a lower bound on the probability that both {b, c} 'implies' {c}' always holds 'and' {b, c} eventually holds, with the right-hand side, the probability that {c} eventually holds. We now reason On the other hand combining the probabilities with & (on the left) correctly is comparable to Q{c}:
Similarly, replacing ⇒ by ⇉ in the fourth axiom in Fig. 7 is incorrect:
does not hold. We have 5 Examples: demonic random walker
We conclude our presentation with an example combining demonic nondeterminism, explicit numeric premises and an explicit numeric conclusion. The unbounded random walk [7] treats a (Markov) process that moves up or down in discrete steps with certain probabilities. We consider a 'demonic' walker whose transition probabilities are uncertain: our premise is that the up and the down transition each are taken with probability at least 1/3; our conclusion will be that the walker moves up (or down) eventually with probability u at least (3 − √ 5)/2, and that the recurrence probability r of the walker's eventually returning to his starting position is at least 1 − √ 5/3. In summary we use the elementary argument that u is at least 1/3, for an immediate move up, plus u 2 /3 for an immediate move down followed by two eventual moves up: then the least solution of u ≥ (u 2 + 1)/3 is our quoted (3 − √ 5)/2; and finally r is calculated from u. Our treatment below with the modal operators thus will formalise that the probabilities may be added that way, that u is independent of the starting position, that the eventualities may be composed, and that r is determined by u.
The demonic walker
We begin with the premise: a specification of the walker. Take the state space S to be the integers Z, so that expectations are of type Z → [0, 1]. For integer s and expectation A we capture the walker's step-by-step behaviour by the inequation for all states s and expectations A that
The walker is nondeterministic in the sense that the probabilities are not given exactly -that in (5) they are only bounded below -and demonic in the sense that our reasoning will hold even if the walker uses the freedom allowed by (5) to make the probability of eventually moving up as low as possible. Let Q{s+1}.s be u (for up). We have 
The demonic stumbler
Now we consider a generalisation: suppose that instead of (5) we have the weaker specification
in which •A is replaced on the left by QA. It is satisfied for example by a random stumbler who on each step with some probability remains where he is: but when he eventually does move, it is with probability at least 1/3 in each direction. (Taking A: = {s−1} and A: = {s+1} in (6) implies that.) Analysis of the stumbler is almost as for the walker, beginning however with
We then reason as before to the same conclusion at no 'extra cost'. The stumbler example exposes an important aspect of our specifications: the walker could have been specified as two statements separately, for all s that •{s+1}.s ≥ 1/3 the walker moves up with probability at least 1/3 and
•{s−1}.s ≥ 1/3 the walker moves down with probability at least 1/3.
But specifying the stumbler similarly would be wrong: the conditions Q{s+1}.s ≥ 1/3 the walker eventually moves up, with probability at least 1/3 and Q{s−1}.s ≥ 1/3 the walker eventually moves down, with probability at least 1/3
are strictly weaker than (6) because they allow stumblers that 'piggyback' -that reach s−1 only after having visited s+1 on the way. And for them the conclusion r ≥ 1 − √ 5/2 is not valid.
Conclusions
Our contribution is the reinterpretation of fixed-point logic -the modal µ-calculus -over expectation-rather than predicate transformers, and a determination of how the standard operators should be embedded in the expanded framework:
• Sec. 3.2 showed how the probabilistic healthiness conditions for expectation transformers [20] give the proper generalisations of the propositional operators;
• Sec. 3.3 used operational arguments [19] to generalise the Boolean modalities to expectations, and explained how they can be extended still further to describe various probabilistic 'gambling games' involving demonic and angelic choice, with the values of the formulae being the expected reward gained from playing the game.
• Sec. 4 ( Fig. 7) establishes the reasoning principles analogous to those for standard temporal logic, when the operators are restricted to the usual modalities •, Q and P. The postulated axioms for • -characterising probabilistic transitions -facilitate proofs of the laws, whilst our use of probabilistic conjunction rather than some other generalisation of ordinary conjunction retains modular reasoning, even for quantitative information.
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• Sec. 5 demonstrates those principles in practice, especially where the result depends on explicit probabilities.
A logic built over that interpretation [19] thus has the advantages of specialising smoothly to the standard case, giving quantitative results where desired yet via the 0-1 Law [25, 18] allowing explicit probabilities to be discarded if irrelevant 12 , having reasoning principles that generalise familiar ones and finally offering the possibility of new applications, beyond strict temporal logic, to probabilistic games, together with a framework for the direct calculation of expected quantities such as space or time complexity [16] .
Finally the greater distinguishing power of [0, 1] over {0, 1} also has compelling implications for specification -the use of (5) for example illustrates how quantitative temporal properties may be expressed in a manner both pleasingly succinct and well-suited for reasoning.
Our emphasis has been on reasoning rather than (for example) on model checking. Huth and Kwiatkowska [12] have interpreted the modal µ-calculus as we do, and take a complementary approach: they show for non-demonic systems that the expectation formulae can be checked by reducing the problem to linear programming or in some cases to simple Gaussian elimination. They establish also that the equivalence induced between formulae by the expectation interpretation lies between probabilistic bisimulation and probabilistic ready bisimulation.
There may also be a connection between model checking and the gamblinggame view [26, 19] .
The approach of pCTL (but not pCTL* ) [3] is close to ours in the following sense. Omit pCTL's operators A and E (expressing absolute judgements rather than extremal probabilities), and consider only the P ≥p -form of probability measures.
13 Then a pCTL state-formula is true in just those states in which the 'equivalent' expectation formula takes the value 1, where the expectation formula is obtained by
• replacing the propositional operators ∨, ∧, ¬ by the arithmetic ⊔, ⊓, (1−) respectively,
• leaving the modal operators as they are and
• replacing P ≥p by (p ⇒), as in Definition 4.1, at all levels of the pCTL formula. Thus for example the pCTL judgement P ≥p QA -expressing that (standard) A will be established eventually with probability at least p -becomes p ⇒ QA (where we interpret A as a characteristic function). Huth and Kwiatkowska establish similar correspondences, but for different sets of formulae: in their Theorem 1 [12] they show that the 'optimistic' view (in our terms the ceiling ⌈·⌉) distributes through any positive existential formula, and that the 'pessimistic' view (⌊·⌋)) distributes through universal formulae.
Moving to pCTL* however we find that there the logics diverge. For example we cannot translate P ≥p (QA ∧ QB)
directly into expectations, because there is no equivalent operator acting between expectations (just numbers) in the way that ∧ acts between path formulae, that contain so much more information. To write as above 'the probability is at least p that both A will be established eventually and B will be established eventually' we would proceed from first principles, thinking of the probability of winning a suitable game:
• if A and B are both false then take a step;
• if one is true but not the other, then take a step but subsequently seek only the other; and
• if both are true then stop (and win).
The expectation formula is thus p ⇒ Q((A ⊓ QB) ⊔ (B ⊓ QA)) .
There may be a more general translation process, based on explicit access to the game interpretations of the modal operators [19] ; and it does seem that simple propositional-free formulae carry over even if they are not in pCTL. For example P ≥p PQA and p ⇒ PQA are equivalent for standard A, both expressing that with probability at least p the predicate A is established infinitely often. Those are topics for further study. Finally, our treatment of nondeterminism does not explicitly mention a scheduler [24, 3] because it does not have to: the (demonic) schedule is built-in to the semantics [20] of expectation transformers. (Recall the infimum used in (2).) A probabilistic scheduler [3] , able to interpolate between discrete choices, corresponds to the probabilistic (convex) closure condition of He [10] . To treat the existential duals ∃X, ∃F and ∃G, we would allow both demonic and angelic nondeterminism in step: as in the standard case, the existential modalities are obtained via a double complementation. The impact of that on the healthiness conditions in that case is discussed elsewhere [17] . 
